


Hourly Offers: Load and Generator Settlement Examples

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- Show the generator settlement from start to finish
 - Potential impacts from raising an offer
 - Potential impacts of lowering an offer
- Show load settlement in the same example
 - Load that has hedged day-ahead
 - Load that has not hedged day-ahead
 - Allocation of uplift



Price curve is GREEN

Cost curve is RED


Markup ~ \$10/MWh

EcoMax = 300 MW

EcoMin = 100 MW

No Load = \$0/hr

Startup = \$0



DA Hour Ending 1000

Generator clears on price offer.

DA LMP = \$45/MWh

DAMW = 225 MW


DA Value = \$10,125 (DA LMP * DAMW)

DA Offer = \$6,062.5 (area under curve at DAMW + startup + no load)

DA Uplift = \$0 (DA Offer - DA Value)

DA Margin = \$4,062.5 (DA Value - DA Offer)

Real-Time #1: Generator Offer Increase & RTLMP = DALMP



RT Hour Ending 1000

Generator increases price offer by \$10/MWh (P' curve).

Assume Deviation Rate = \$1.00/MWh

RTLMP = \$45/MWh

RTMW = 175 MW

BAL Value Actual = $-\$2,250$ (RTMW (actual) - DAMW) * RTLMP

BAL Value Used = $\$0$ (RTMW (from DA Curve) - DAMW) * RTLMP

BOR Offer = $\$4,437.5$ (area under curve at RTMW + startup + no load)

- This calculation uses the lesser of the DA and final RT curves

Schedule Deviation Charge =


$$|225 \text{ MW} - 175 \text{ MW}| * \$1.00/\text{MWh} = \$50$$

- Generation resource increased its offer in real-time
- When $RTLMP = DALMP$
 - The resource is dispatched to a lower output in RT
 - The resource buys out of the DA commitment at a net loss (Negative Balancing Value)
 - The resource is charged a schedule deviation penalty

$$\begin{aligned} \text{BOR Credit} &= \text{Max}(\$0, \text{BOR Offer} - \text{DA Value} - \text{BAL Value Used}) \\ &= \text{Max}(\$0, \$4,437.5 - \$10,125 - \$0) = \mathbf{\$0} \end{aligned}$$

Real-Time #2: No Offer Change & RTLMP = DALMP

RT Hour Ending 1000



RTLMP = \$45/MWh

RTMW = 225 MW

BAL Value Actual = \$0 (RTMW (actual) - DAMW) * RTLMP

BAL Value Used = \$0 (RTMW (from DA Curve) - DAMW) * RTLMP

BOR Offer = \$6,062.5 (area under curve at RTMW + startup + no load)

- This calculation uses the lesser of the DA and final RT curves
- Since the offer was not changed, the DA offer is used


Schedule Deviation Charge = N/A

- Generation resource does not change its offer
- When $RTLMP = DALMP$
 - The resource is dispatched identically
 - The Balancing Value is \$0 due to no MW differences
 - No schedule change penalty

$$\begin{aligned} \text{BOR Credit} &= \text{Max}(\$0, \text{BOR Offer} - \text{DA Value} - \text{BAL Value Used}) \\ &= \text{Max}(\$0, \$6,062.5 - \$10,125 - \$0) = \mathbf{\$0} \end{aligned}$$

	Offer Changed	No Offer Change
DA Value	\$10,125	\$10,125
BAL Value <i>Actual</i>	-\$2,250	\$0
BAL Value <i>Used</i>	\$0	\$0
RT Cost	-\$4,437.5	-\$6,062.5
BOR Credit	\$0	\$0
Schedule Deviation	-\$50	\$0
Net Settlement	\$3,387.5	\$4,062.5

- In this example, the cost to buy out of the DA commitment exceeds the cost of generating to meet it
- The generation owner nets ~ \$700 less by increasing their offer in real-time and being dispatched lower



DA Hour Ending 1000

Generator clears on price offer.

DALMP = \$45/MWh

DAMW = 225 MW


DA Value = \$10,125 (DALMP * DAMW)

DA Offer = \$6,062.5 (area under curve at DAMW + startup + no load)

DA Uplift = \$0 (DA Offer – DA Value)

DA Margin = \$4,062.5 (DA Value – DA Offer)

Real-Time #3: Generator Offer Increase & RTLMP > DALMP



RT Hour Ending 1000

Generator increases price offer by \$10/MWh (P' curve).

Assume Deviation Rate = \$1.00/MWh

RTLMP = \$60/MWh

RTMW = 250 MW

BAL Value Actual = +\$1,500 (RTMW (actual) - DAMW) * RTLMP

BOR Offer = \$6,125 (area under curve at RTMW + startup + no load)

- This calculation uses the lesser of the DA and final RT curves

Schedule Deviation Charge =

$$| 300 \text{ MW} - 250 \text{ MW} | * \$1.00/\text{MWh} = \$50$$

- Generation resource increases its offer
- When $RTLMP > DALMP$
 - The resource is dispatched below where it would be on its DA curve
 - The Actual Balancing Value is lower as a result (\$1,500 vs. \$4,500)
 - The unit receives a schedule change penalty

$$\begin{aligned} \text{BOR Credit} &= \text{Max}(\$0, \text{BOR Offer} - \text{DA Value} - \text{BAL Value}) \\ &= \text{Max}(\$0, \$6,125 - \$10,125 - \$1,500) = \mathbf{\$0} \end{aligned}$$

	Offer Changed	No Offer Change
DA Value	\$10,125	\$10,125
BAL Value <i>Actual</i>	\$1,500	\$4,500
RT Cost	-\$6,125	-\$8,000
BOR Credit	\$0	\$0
Schedule Deviation	-\$50	\$0
Net Settlement	\$5,450	\$6,625

- In this example, the reduced MW output in real-time due to the increase in offer decreases the revenues the resource would have collected by exceeding its DA commitment
- The generation owner nets ~ \$1,200 less by increasing their offer in real-time and being dispatched lower


- The opposite behavior would be to lower offers in real-time as compared to day-ahead
- This would result in lower LMPs in real-time (all other things held equal) and a positive balancing value for the generator
 - Presuming it outperforms the DA commitment and $RTLMP > \$0$
- The individual generation resource's uplift payment would reduce but the addition of low-priced MW would lower LMPs and potentially increase uplift market-wide

- PJM is not proposing any change to the settlement of loads in day-ahead and real-time
- PJM is not proposing any change to how uplift is allocated to loads

- Loads cleared in the Day-Ahead Market
 - Pay the corresponding LMP
 - Are allocated a share of day-ahead uplift
- Loads schedule deviations from the Day-Ahead Market
 - Pay the corresponding real-time LMP
 - Are allocated a share of real-time uplift for resources not scheduled for conservative operations

- The cost of resources committed for conservative operations are generally allocated to load
- These resources, like all others
 - Will receive a DA uplift payment to the DA offer if DA revenues do not cover the cost
 - Will receive a BOR payment to the lesser of the committed or final offer if the real-time operating costs are not recovered
- The BOR payment to these resources cannot be increased by increases in offers in real-time
 - BOR is limited to the lesser of the committed or final offer

Load Settlement Example for LSE A in Day-Ahead



DA Hour Ending 1000

Load clears 1,000 MW in day-ahead

Ratio share for uplift allocation is 1%

Total Day-Ahead Uplift = \$200,000

DALMP = \$45/MWh


DAMW = 1,000 MW

Day-Ahead Energy Charge = \$45,000

Day-Ahead Uplift Charge = \$2,000

Total Day-Ahead Settlement = \$47,000


Gen-Side: Generator Offer Increase & RTLMP > DALMP



- Generator offer increased in real-time
 - Resource only made whole up to committed offer
- LMP increase in real-time
- Potential overall reduction in BOR due to higher LMP

	Offer Changed	No Offer Change
DA Value	\$10,125	\$10,125
BAL Value <i>Actual</i>	\$1,500	\$4,500
RT Cost	-\$6,125	-\$8,000
BOR Credit	\$0	\$0
Schedule Deviation	-\$50	\$0
Net Settlement	\$5,450	\$6,625

Load Settlement Example for LSE A in Real-Time



RT Hour Ending 1000

Real-Time load is 1,112 MW

Load is deviating by 112 MW

Assume deviation rate is \$1.00/MWh

RTLMP = \$60/MWh

RTMW = 1,112 MW

Balancing Energy Charge = \$6,720

BOR Charge = \$112

Total Charges to LSE A = \$53,832

- Deviating schedules from DA will likely have been paid less uplift due to higher RT LMPs
 - Deviation rate is lower due to less uplift to allocate
- Resource that has increased its offer has made less money than it otherwise would have
 - No increase in its uplift due to offer increase
- Exposure for loads is to the real-time LMP as it is today
- Best way to avoid impacts of offer changes in real-time is to hedge day-ahead

- Hourly offers will impact the LMP calculation and uplift quantities
 - Direction and magnitude are difficult to determine
 - No studies available from entities with hourly offers already
- All other things being equal,
 - Increases in offer prices in real-time will result in a(n)
 - Increase in the RT LMP compared to DA LMP
 - Decrease in the uplift allocation to deviations due to higher RT LMPs
 - Decreases in offer prices in real-time will result in a(n)
 - Decrease to the RT LMP as compared to DA LMP
 - Increase in the uplift allocation to deviations due to lower RT LMPs