

## 5.14 Clearing Prices and Charges

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h) Minimum Offer Price Rule ~~for Certain Generation Capacity Resources~~ [for Generation Capacity Resources](#)

(1) General Rule. Any Sell Offer submitted in any RPM Auction for any Delivery Year based on a MOPR Screened Generation Resource shall have an offer price no lower than the MOPR Floor Offer Price for the period specified in this subsection (h), unless the Capacity Market Seller has obtained a Self-Supply Exemption, a Competitive ~~Entry~~ Exemption, [a Public Power Exemption, a Renewable Portfolio Standard \(RPS\) Exemption,](#) or a Unit-Specific Exception with respect to such MOPR Screened Generation Resource in such auction prior to the submission of such offer, in accordance with the provisions of this subsection. Nothing in subsection (c) of this section 5.14 shall be read to excuse compliance of any Sell Offer with the requirements of this subsection (h).

(2) Applicability. A MOPR Screened Generation Resource shall be any Generation Capacity Resource, and any uprate ~~or planned uprate~~ to a Generation Capacity Resource that ~~is being, or has been, modified to provide or will provide increase the number of megawatts of available installed capacity thereof by 20 MW or more, based on a combustion turbine, combined cycle, or integrated gasification combined cycle generating plant (including Repowering of an existing plant whenever the repowered plant utilizes combustion turbine, combined cycle, or integrated gasification combined cycle technology) with an installed capacity rating, combined for all units comprising such resource~~ at a single point of interconnection to the Transmission System, of no less than 20 MW; provided, however, that a MOPR Screened Generation Resource shall not include: ~~(i) the Installed Capacity equivalent (measured as of the time of clearing) of any of a resource's Unforced Capacity that has cleared any RPM Auction conducted prior to February 1, 2013 or an uprate of such resource to the extent that the developer or owner of the uprate timely submitted a request for, and PJM issued, an offer floor pursuant to the unit specific exception process of this subsection (h) before the start of the commencement of the Base Residual Auction for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year and the capacity associated with the uprate clears that auction; (ii) any unit primarily fueled with landfill gas, uranium, solar energy, wind energy, hydraulic or tidal energy, geothermal energy, stored electricity; (iii) any~~ cogeneration unit that is certified or self-certified as a Qualifying Facility (as defined in Part 292 of FERC's regulations), where the Capacity Market Seller is the owner of the Qualifying Facility or has contracted for the Unforced Capacity of such facility and the Unforced Capacity of the unit is no larger than approximately all of the Unforced Capacity Obligation of the host load, and all Unforced Capacity of the unit is used to meet the Unforced Capacity Obligation of the host load. A MOPR Screened Generation Resource shall include all Generation Capacity Resources located in the PJM Region that meet the foregoing criteria, and all Generation Capacity Resources located outside the PJM Region, ~~(where such Sell Offer is based solely on such resource) that entered commercial service on or after January 1, 2013, that meet the foregoing criteria and that require sufficient transmission investment for delivery to the PJM Region to indicate a long term commitment to providing capacity to the PJM Region.~~

(3) ~~MOPR Floor Offer Price.~~ The MOPR Floor Offer Price shall be 100% of the Net Asset Class Cost of New Entry for the relevant generator type and location, as determined hereunder. The gross Cost of New Entry component of the Net Asset Class Cost of New Entry shall be, for purposes of the 2018/2019 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the values indicated in the table below for each CONE Area for a combustion turbine generator (“CT”), a combined cycle generator (“CC”), and an integrated gasification combined cycle generator (“IGCC”), respectively, and shall be adjusted for subsequent Delivery Years in accordance with subsection (h)(3)(i) below. For purposes of Incremental Auctions for the 2015/2016, 2016/2017 and 2017/2018 Delivery Years, the MOPR Floor Offer Price shall be the same as that used in the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year. The estimated energy and ancillary service revenues for each type of plant shall be determined as described in subsection (h)(3)(ii) below.

	CONE Area 1	CONE Area 2	CONE Area 3	CONE Area 4
CT \$/MW-yr	132,200	130,300	128,900	130,300
CC \$/MW-yr	185,700	176,000	172,600	179,400
IGCC \$/MW-yr	582,042	558,486	547,240	537,306

~~—— i) —— Commencing with the Delivery Year that begins on June 1, 2019, the gross Cost of New Entry component of the Net Asset Class Cost of New Entry shall be adjusted to reflect changes in generating plant construction costs in the same manner as set forth for the cost of new entry in section 5.10(a)(iv)(B), provided, however, that the Applicable BLS Composite Index used for CC plants shall be calculated from the three indices referenced in that section but weighted 25% for the wages index, 60% for the construction materials index, and 15% for the turbines index, and provided further that nothing herein shall preclude the Office of the Interconnection from filing to change the Net Asset Class Cost of New Entry for any Delivery Year pursuant to appropriate filings with FERC under the Federal Power Act.~~

~~—— ii) —— For purposes of this provision, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for a combustion turbine generator shall be that determined by section 5.10(a)(v)(A) of this Attachment DD, provided that the energy revenue estimate for each CONE Area shall be based on the Zone within such CONE Area that has the highest energy revenue estimate calculated under the methodology in that subsection. The net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for a combined cycle generator shall be determined in the same manner as that prescribed for a combustion turbine generator in the previous sentence, except that the heat rate assumed for the combined cycle resource shall be 6.722 MMBtu/Mwh, the variable operations and maintenance expenses for such resource shall be \$3.23 per MWh, the Peak Hour Dispatch scenario for both the Day Ahead and Real Time Energy Markets shall be modified to dispatch the resource continuously during the full peak hour period, as described in section 2.46, for each such period that the resource is economic (using the test set forth in such section), rather than only during the four hour blocks within such period that such resource is economic, and the ancillary service revenues shall be \$3198 per MW-year. The net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for an integrated gasification combined cycle generator shall be determined in the same manner as that prescribed for a combustion turbine generator above, except that the heat rate assumed for the combined cycle resource shall be 8.7 MMBtu/Mwh, the variable operations and maintenance expenses for such resource shall be \$7.77 per MWh, the Peak Hour Dispatch scenario for both the Day Ahead and Real Time Energy Markets shall be modified to dispatch the resource continuously during the full peak hour period, as described in section 2.46, for each such period~~

~~that the resource is economic (using the test set forth in such section), rather than only during the four hour blocks within such period that such resource is economic, and the ancillary service revenues shall be \$3,198 per MW year.~~

~~(4) — MOPR Floor Offer Price. The default MOPR Floor Offer Price for a Capacity Performance resource shall be the product of the Net Cost of New Entry (applicable for the Delivery Year and Locational Deliverability Area for which such Capacity Performance Resource is offered) times the average of the Balancing Ratios during the Performance Assessment Hours in the three consecutive calendar years that precede the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year.~~

~~(4) Duration. The MOPR Floor Offer Price shall apply to any Sell Offer based on a MOPR Screened Generation Resource (to the extent an exemption has not been obtained for such resource under this subsection) until (and including) the first Delivery Year for which a Sell Offer based on the non-exempt portion of such resource has cleared an RPM Auction. [Reserve for future use.]~~

(5) Effect of Exemption or Exception. To the extent a Sell Offer in any RPM Auction for any Delivery Year is based on a MOPR Screened Generation Resource for which the Capacity Market Seller obtains, prior to the submission of such offer, ~~either a Competitive Entry Exemption or a Self-Supply Exemption~~ any of the Exemptions defined in subsections (6), (7), (7A) or (7B), such offer (to the extent of such exemption) may include an offer price below the MOPR Floor Offer Price (including, without limitation, an offer price of zero or other indication of intent to clear regardless of price). To the extent a Sell Offer in any RPM Auction for any Delivery Year is based on a MOPR Screened Generation Resource for which the Capacity Market Seller obtains, prior to the submission of such offer, a Unit-Specific Exception, such offer (to the extent of such exception) may include an offer price below the MOPR Floor Offer Price but no lower than the minimum offer price determined in such exception process. ~~The Installed Capacity equivalent of any MOPR Screened Generation Resource's Unforced Capacity that has both obtained such an exemption or exception and cleared the RPM Auction for which it obtained such exemption or exception shall not be subject to a MOPR Floor Offer Price in any subsequent RPM Auction, except as provided in subsection (h)(10) hereof.~~

(6) Self-Supply Exemption. A Capacity Market Seller that is a Self-Supply LSE may qualify its MOPR Screened Generation Resource in any RPM Auction for any Delivery Year for a Self-Supply Exemption if the MOPR Screened Generation Resource satisfies the criteria specified below:

i) Cost and revenue criteria. The costs and revenues associated with a MOPR Screened Generation Resource for which a Self-Supply LSE seeks a Self-Supply Exemption may permissibly reflect: (A) payments, concessions, rebates, subsidies, or incentives designed to incent or promote, or participation in a program, contract, or other arrangement that utilizes criteria designed to incent or promote, general industrial development in an area; (B) payments, concessions, rebates, subsidies or incentives from a county or other local government authority designed to incent, or participation in a program, contract or other arrangement established by a county or other local governmental authority utilizing eligibility or selection

criteria designed to incent, siting facilities in that county or locality rather than another county or locality; (C) revenues received by the Self-Supply LSE attributable to the inclusion of costs of the MOPR Screened Generation Resource in such LSE's regulated retail rates where such LSE is a Vertically Integrated Utility and the MOPR Screened Generation Resource is planned consistent with such LSE's most recent integrated resource plan found reasonable by the RERRA to meet the needs of its customers; and (D) ~~payments to the Self-Supply LSE (such as retail rate recovery) traditionally associated with revenues and costs of Public Power Entities (or joint action of multiple Public Power Entities); revenues to a Public Power Entity from its contracts having a term of one year or more with its members or customers (including wholesale power contracts between an electric cooperative and its members); or~~ cost or revenue advantages related to a longstanding business model employed by the Self-Supply LSE, such as its financial condition, tax status, access to capital, or other similar conditions affecting the Self-Supply LSE's costs and revenues. A Self-Supply Exemption shall not be permitted to the extent that the Self-Supply LSE, acting either as the Capacity Market Seller or on behalf of the Capacity Market Seller, has any formal or informal agreements or arrangements to seek, recover, accept or receive: (E) any material payments, concessions, rebates, or subsidies, connected to the construction, or clearing in any RPM Auction, of the MOPR Screened Generation Resource, not described by (A) through (D) of this section; or (F) other support through contracts having a term of one year or more obtained in any procurement process sponsored or mandated by any state legislature or agency connected with the construction, or clearing in any RPM Auction, of the MOPR Screened Generation Resource. Any cost and revenue advantages described by (A) through (D) of this subsection that are material to the cost of the MOPR Screened Generation Resource and that are irregular or anomalous, that do not reflect arms-length transactions, or that are not in the ordinary course of the Self-Supply LSE's business, shall disqualify application of the Self-Supply Exemption unless the Self-Supply LSE demonstrates in the exemption process provided hereunder that such costs and revenues are consistent with the overall objectives of the Self-Supply Exemption.

ii) Owned and Contracted Capacity. To qualify for the Self-Supply Exemption, the Self-Supply LSE, acting either as the Capacity Market Seller or on behalf of the Capacity Market Seller, must demonstrate that the MOPR Screened Generation Resource is included in such LSE's Owned and Contracted Capacity and that its Owned and Contracted Capacity meets the criteria outlined below after the addition of such MOPR Screened Generation Resource.

iii) Maximum Net Short Position. If the excess, if any, of the Self-Supply LSE's Estimated Capacity Obligation above its Owned and Contracted Capacity ("Net Short") is less than the amount of Unforced Capacity specified in or calculated under the table below for all relevant areas based on the specified type of LSE, then this exemption criterion is satisfied. For this purpose, the Net Short position shall be calculated for any Self-Supply LSE requesting this exemption for the PJM Region and for each LDA specified in the table below in which the MOPR Screened Generation Resource is located (including through nesting of LDAs) to the extent the Self-Supply LSE has an Estimated Capacity Obligation in such LDA. If the Self-Supply LSE does not have an Estimated Capacity Obligation in an evaluated LDA, then the Self-Supply LSE is deemed to satisfy the test for that LDA.

Type of Self-Supply LSE	Maximum Net Short Position (UCAP MW, measured at RTO, MAAC,
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	SWMAAC and EMAAC unless otherwise specified)
Single Customer Entity	150 MW
<del>Public Power Entity</del>	<del>1000 MW</del>
<del>Multi-state Public Power Entity*</del>	<del>1000 MW in SWMAAC, EMAAC, or MAAC LDAs and 1800 MW RTO</del>
Vertically Integrated Utility	20% of LSE's Reliability Requirement

~~\*A Multi-state Public Power Entity shall not have more than 90% of its total load in any one state.~~

iv) Maximum Net Long Position. If the excess, if any, of the Self-Supply LSE's Owned and Contracted Capacity for the PJM Region above its Estimated Capacity Obligation for the PJM Region ("Net Long"), is less than the amount of Unforced Capacity specified in or calculated under the table below, then this exemption criterion is satisfied:

Self-Supply LSE Total Estimated Capacity Obligation in the PJM Region (UCAP MW)	Maximum Net Long Position (UCAP MW)
Less than 500	75 MW
Greater than or equal to 500 and less than 5,000	15% of LSE's Estimated Capacity Obligation
Greater than or equal to 5,000 and less than 15,000	750 MW
Greater than or equal to 15,000 and less than 25,000	1,000 MW
Greater than or equal to 25,000	4% of LSE's Estimated Capacity Obligation capped at 1300 MWs

If the MOPR Screened Generation Resource causes the Self-Supply LSE's Net Long Position to exceed the applicable threshold stated above, the MOPR Floor Offer Price shall apply, for the Delivery Year in which such threshold is exceeded, only to the quantity of Unforced Capacity of such resource that exceeds such threshold. In such event, such Unforced Capacity of such resource shall be subject to the MOPR Floor Offer Price for the period specified in subsection (h)(4) hereof; provided however, that any such Unforced Capacity that did not qualify for such exemption for such Delivery Year may qualify for such exemption in any RPM Auction for a future Delivery Year to the extent the Self-Supply LSE's future load growth accommodates the resource under the Net Long Position criteria.

v) Beginning with the Delivery Year that commences June 1, 2020, and continuing no later than for every fourth Delivery Year thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection shall review the Maximum Net Short and Net Long positions, as required by the foregoing subsection. Such review may include, without limitation, analyses under various appropriate scenarios of the minimum net short quantities at which the benefit to an LSE of a clearing price reduction for its capacity purchases from the RPM Auction outweighs the cost to the LSE of a new or existing generating unit that is offered at an uneconomic price, and may, to the extent appropriate, reasonably balance the need to protect the market with the need to accommodate the normal business operations of Self-Supply LSEs. Based on the results of such review, PJM shall

propose either to modify or retain the existing Maximum Net Short and Net Long positions. The Office of the Interconnection shall post publicly and solicit stakeholder comment regarding the proposal. If, as a result of this process, changes to the Maximum Net Short and/or Net Long positions are proposed, the Office of the Interconnection shall file such modified Maximum Net Short and/or Net Long positions with the FERC by October 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.

vi) Officer Certification. The Self-Supply LSE, acting either as the Capacity Market Seller or on behalf of the Capacity Market Seller, shall submit a sworn, notarized certification of a duly authorized officer, certifying that the officer has personal knowledge of, or has engaged in a diligent inquiry to determine, the facts and circumstances supporting the Capacity Market Seller's decision to submit a Sell Offer into the RPM Auction for the MOPR Screened Generation Resource and seek an exemption from the MOPR Floor Offer Price for such resource, and to the best of his/her knowledge and belief: (A) the information supplied to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of Interconnection in support of its exemption request is true and correct and the MOPR Screened Generation Resource will be Owned and Contracted Capacity for the purpose of self-supply for the benefit of the Self-Supply LSE; (B) the Self-Supply LSE has disclosed all material facts relevant to the exemption request; and (C) the Capacity Market Seller satisfies the criteria for the exemption.

vii) For purposes of the Self-Supply Exemption:

(A) "Self-Supply LSE" means the following types of Load Serving Entity, which operate under long-standing business models: Municipal/Cooperative Entity, Single Customer Entity, or Vertically Integrated Utility.

~~(B) "Municipal/Cooperative Entity" means cooperative and municipal utilities, including public power supply entities comprised of either or both of the same, and joint action agencies.~~

~~(C) "Vertically Integrated Utility" means a utility that owns generation, includes such generation in its regulated rates, and earns a regulated return on its investment in such generation.~~

~~(D) "Single Customer Entity" means an LSE that serves at retail only customers that are under common control with such LSE, where such control means holding 51% or more of the voting securities or voting interests of the LSE and all its retail customers.~~

~~(BE)~~ All capacity calculations shall be on an Unforced Capacity basis.

~~(CF)~~ Estimated Capacity Obligations and Owned and Contracted Capacity shall be measured on a three-year average basis for the three years starting with the first day of the Delivery Year associated with the RPM Auction for which the exemption is being sought ("MOPR Exemption Measurement Period"). Such measurements shall be verified by PJM using the latest available data that PJM uses to determine capacity obligations.

(DG) The Self-Supply LSE's Estimated Capacity Obligation shall be the average, for the three Delivery Years of the MOPR Exemption Measurement Period, of the Self-Supply LSE's estimated share of the most recent available Zonal Peak Load Forecast for each such Delivery Year for each Zone in which the Self-Supply LSE will serve load during such Delivery Year, times the Forecast Pool Requirement established for the first such Delivery Year, shall be stated on an Unforced Capacity basis. The Self-Supply LSE's share of such load shall be determined by the ratio of: (1) the peak load contributions, from the most recent summer peak for which data is available at the time of the exemption request, of the customers or areas within each Zone for which such LSE will have load-serving responsibility during the first Delivery Year of the MOPR Exemption Measurement Period to (2) the weather-normalized summer peak load of such Zone for the same summer peak period addressed in the previous clause. Notwithstanding the foregoing, solely in the case of any Self-Supply LSE that demonstrates to the Office of the Interconnection that its annual peak load occurs in the winter, such LSE's Estimated Capacity Obligation determined solely for the purposes of this subsection 5.14(h) shall be based on its winter peak. Once submitted, an exemption request shall not be subject to change due to later revisions to the PJM load forecasts for such Delivery Years. The Self-Supply LSE's Estimated Capacity Obligation shall be limited to the LSE's firm obligations to serve specific identifiable customers or groups of customers including native load obligations and specific load obligations in effective contracts for which the term of the contract includes at least a portion of the Delivery Year associated with the RPM Auction for which the exemption is requested (and shall not include load that is speculative or load obligations that are not native load or customer specific); as well as retail loads of entities that directly (as through charges on a retail electric bill) or indirectly, contribute to the cost recovery of the MOPR Screened Generation Resource; provided, however, nothing herein shall require a Self-Supply LSE that is a joint owner of a MOPR Screened Generation Resource to aggregate its expected loads with the loads of any other joint owner for purposes of such Self-Supply LSE's exemption request.

(EH) "Owned and Contracted Capacity" includes all of the Self-Supply LSE's qualified Capacity Resources, whether internal or external to PJM. For purposes of the Self-Supply Exemption, Owned and Contracted Capacity includes Generation Capacity Resources without regard to whether such resource has failed or could fail the Competitive and Non-Discriminatory procurement standard of the Competitive ~~Entry~~-Exemption. To qualify for a Self-Supply ~~Entry~~ exemption, the MOPR Screened Generation must be used by the Self-Supply LSE, meaning such Self-Supply LSE is the beneficial off-taker of such generation such that the owned or contracted for MOPR Screened Generation is for the Self-Supply LSE's use to supply its customer(s).

(F) If multiple entities will have an ownership or contractual share in, or are otherwise sponsoring, the MOPR Screened Generation Resource, the positions of each such entity will be measured and considered for a Self-Supply Exemption with respect to the individual Self-Supply LSE's ownership or contractual share of such resource.

(7) Competitive ~~Entry~~-Exemption. A Capacity Market Seller may qualify a MOPR Screened Generation Resource for a Competitive ~~Entry~~-Exemption in any RPM Auction

for any Delivery Year if the Capacity Market Seller demonstrates that the MOPR Screened Generation Resource satisfies all of the following criteria:

i) No costs of the MOPR Screened Generation Resource are recovered from customers either directly or indirectly through a non-bypassable charge, except in the event that Sections 5.14(h)(7)(ii) and (iii), to the extent either or both are applicable to such resource, are satisfied.

ii) No costs of the MOPR Screened Generation Resource are supported through any contracts having a term of one year or more obtained in any state-sponsored or state-mandated procurement processes that are not Competitive and Non-Discriminatory. The Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit may deem a procurement process to be "Competitive and Non-Discriminatory" only if: (A) both new and existing resources may satisfy the requirements of the procurement; (B) the requirements of the procurement are fully objective and transparent; (C) the procurement terms do not restrict the type of capacity resources that may participate in and satisfy the requirements of the procurement; (D) the procurement terms do not include selection criteria that could give preference to new resources; and (E) the procurement terms do not use indirect means to discriminate against existing capacity, such as geographic constraints inconsistent with LDA import capabilities, unit technology or unit fuel requirements or unit heat-rate requirements, identity or nature of seller requirements, or requirements for new construction.

iii) The Capacity Market Seller does not have any formal or informal agreements or arrangements to seek, recover, accept or receive any (A) material payments, concessions, rebates, or subsidies directly or indirectly from any governmental entity connected with the construction, or clearing in any RPM Auction, of the MOPR Screened Generation Resource, or (B) other material support through contracts having a term of one year or more obtained in any state-sponsored or state-mandated procurement processes, connected to the construction, or clearing in any RPM Auction, of the MOPR Screened Generation Resource. These restrictions shall not include (C) payments (including payments in lieu of taxes), concessions, rebates, subsidies, or incentives designed to incent, or participation in a program, contract or other arrangement that utilizes criteria designed to incent or promote, general industrial development in an area; (D) payments, concessions, rebates, subsidies or incentives designed to incent, or participation in a program, contract or other arrangements from a county or other local governmental authority using eligibility or selection criteria designed to incent, siting facilities in that county or locality rather than another county or locality; or (E) federal government production tax credits, investment tax credits, and similar tax advantages or incentives that are available to generators without regard to the geographic location of the generation.

iv) The Capacity Market Seller shall submit a sworn, notarized certification of a duly authorized officer, certifying that the officer has personal knowledge of, or has engaged in a diligent inquiry to determine, the facts and circumstances supporting the Capacity Market Seller's decision to submit a Sell Offer into the RPM Auction for the MOPR Screened Generation Resource and seek an exemption from the MOPR Floor Offer Price for such resource, and, to the best of his/her knowledge and belief: (A) the information supplied to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of Interconnection to support its exemption is true and correct and the resource is being constructed or contracted for purposes of competitive entry by the Capacity Market Seller; (B) the



Capacity Market Seller has disclosed all material facts relevant to the request for the exemption; and (C) the exemption request satisfies the criteria for the exemption.

(7A) Public Power Entity Exemption. A Capacity Market Seller that is a Public Power Entity or an Electric Cooperative (as defined in Article 1 Sections 1.17 and 1.72 of the Reliability Assurance Agreement) may qualify MOPR Screened Generation Resources for a Public Power Entity Exemption in any RPM Auction for any Delivery Year if the Capacity Market Seller demonstrates that the MOPR Screened Generation Resources satisfy all of the following criteria:

- i) The entity's Owned and Contracted Capacity is constructed or procured in a manner that is consistent with the Public Power Entity's or Electric Cooperative's longstanding business model to provide for the long-term power supply needs of its customers and/or members, as demonstrated by documents including power supply contracts with its customer and/or members, company business charter, or other governing documents for the Public Power Entity or Electric Cooperative; and
- ii) The costs associated with the entity's Owned and Contracted Capacity are recoverable through the entity's rates to its customers and or members.

The long term resource plans for a public entity's Owned and Contracted Capacity, as defined in subsection (6), are consistent with its business model and such resource plans are intended to be balanced with its load obligations (i.e. over such long term planning horizon, the entity's resources are planned to be less than or equal to its LSE Total Estimated Capacity Obligation), as defined in subsection (6)(The public entity shall notify PJM and the IMM when it expects its Owned and Contracted Capacity to be greater than its LSE Total Estimated Capacity Obligation in the next RPM commitment period and describe the consistency of the investment decision with its business model);

ii) Owned and Contracted Capacity is less than or equal to 600 MW greater than LSE Total Estimated Capacity Obligation in any Delivery Year;

iii) the Public Power Entity will notify PJM and the IMM when it expects its Owned and Contracted Capacity to be greater than its LSE Total Estimated Capacity Obligation and describe the consistency of the investment decision with its business model; and

iv) a sworn, notarized certification of a duly authorized officer of the Electric Cooperative or Public Power Entity owner/contractor is submitted certifying that the officer has personal knowledge of, or has engaged in a diligent inquiry to determine, the facts and circumstances supporting the Electric Cooperative's or Public Power Entity's decision to submit a Sell Offer into the RPM Auction for the MOPR Screened Generation Resource and seek an exemption from the MOPR Floor Offer Price for such resource, and to the best of his/her knowledge and belief: (A) the information supplied to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of Interconnection in support of its exemption request is true and correct and the MOPR Screened Generation Resource will be Owned and Contracted Capacity for the purpose of self supply for the benefit of the Electric Cooperative or Public Power Entity; (B) the Electric Cooperative or Public

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Power Entity has disclosed all material facts relevant to the exemption request; and (C) the Capacity Market Seller satisfies the criteria for the exemption.; and

\_\_\_\_\_ iv) \_\_\_\_\_ the criteria concerning cost and revenue set forth in subsection 5.14(h)(6)(i) are satisfied.

Any excess supply, starting with the resource(s) most recently added to the portfolio, will be subject to the MOPR floor unless it qualifies for a unit specific exception, where excess supply is the MW amount of Owned and Contracted Capacity in excess of the sum of LSE Total Estimated Capacity Obligation and 600 MW. The MOPR floor or unit specific exception shall apply to the last unit(s) added to Owned and Contracted Capacity.

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\_\_\_\_\_ (7B) RPS Exemption. A Capacity Market Seller may qualify a MOPR Screened Generation Resource for an RPS Exemption in any RPM Auction for any Delivery Year if the Capacity Market Seller demonstrates that the MOPR Screened Generation Resource satisfies the following criterion:

i) \_\_\_\_\_ the resource was procured in a program in compliance with a state mandated renewable portfolio standard prior to December 31, 2018, or based on a request for proposals (RFP) issued under such a program prior to December 31, 2018.

or satisfies all of the following criteria:

\_\_\_\_\_ i) \_\_\_\_\_ the resource ~~is procured~~ complies with the requirements of ~~in~~ a state mandated renewable portfolio standard or voluntary renewable portfolio standard ~~program~~;

\_\_\_\_\_ ii) \_\_\_\_\_ the terms of such program are competitive and non-discriminatory, meaning that (1) the program requires LSEs to procure a defined amount of renewable resources, (2) both new and existing resources may participate, (3) all suppliers of renewable resources may participate, (4) the requirements of the program are fully objective and transparent, (5) ~~and~~ the program terms do not include selection criteria that could give preference to new or existing resources, ~~and no~~ (6) the program terms do not use indirect means ~~are employed~~ to discriminate against new or existing capacity, (7) the program terms do not use any locational requirement, e.g. offshore wind, other than restricting imports from other states, and (8) the renewable characteristic is the only screen for participation in the program where renewable does not include coal, natural gas or nuclear thermal resources;

\_\_\_\_\_ iii) \_\_\_\_\_ the structure of such program is competitive and non-discriminatory, meaning: there are at least 10 independent sellers that make offers consisting of price, quantity pairs; the program passes a three pivotal supplier test; and renewable characteristic(s) is the only screen for participation in program if the program does not use an auction, the terms of such program: (1) are consistent with fair market value and standard industry practice and (2) provide that the price paid for renewable energy credits is determined by the contract terms between the seller and the buyer.;

~~\_\_\_\_\_ iv) any single state or multi state auction, if the program uses an auction is used by such program, whether either as a means of procuring renewable attributes to meet state requirements, or as a means to facilitate the procurement of renewable attributes by responsible LSEs, such auction must be is-competitive and non-discriminatory, meaning (1) winner(s) of auction based on selects resources with lowest offers prices, and sets the terms of (2) payments to winners for selected resources based on auction clearing prices, and (3) at least three nonaffiliated sellers participate.~~

~~\_\_\_\_\_ v) any bilateral transactions executed by parties in compliance with that program are deemed competitive and non-discriminatory;~~

~~\_\_\_\_\_ vi) such process provide for consistent terms of trade across PJM, including allowance for imports and exports meeting consistent definition of renewable across all PJM states;~~

~~\_\_\_\_\_ vii) transparent, public data on renewable energy credits (REC) prices and quantities will be provided; and~~

~~\_\_\_\_\_ viii) a sworn, notarized certification of a duly authorized officer of the Capacity Market Seller is submitted certifying that the officer has personal knowledge of, or has engaged in a diligent inquiry to determine, the facts and circumstances supporting Seller's decision to submit a Sell Offer into the RPM Auction for the MOPR Screened Generation Resource and seek an exemption from the MOPR Floor Offer Price for such resource, and to the best of his/her knowledge and belief: (A) the information supplied to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of Interconnection in support of its exemption request is true and correct and the MOPR Screened Generation Resource will be Owned and Contracted Capacity for the benefit of the Seller; (B) Seller has disclosed all material facts relevant to the exemption request; and (C) the Seller satisfies the criteria for the exemption.~~

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(8) Unit-Specific Exception. A Capacity Market Seller intending to submit a Sell Offer in any RPM Auction below the MOPR Floor Offer Price for any Delivery Year based on a MOPR Screened Generation Resource may, at its election, submit a request for a Unit-Specific Exception in addition to, or in lieu of, a request for an ~~Self Supply Exemption under subsection (6), (7), (7A) or (7B), or a Competitive Entry Exemption~~, for such MOPR Screened Generation Resource. A Sell Offer meeting the Unit-Specific Exception criteria in this subsection shall be permitted and shall not be re-set to the MOPR Floor Offer Price if the Capacity Market Seller obtains a determination from the Office of the Interconnection or the Commission, prior to the RPM Auction in which it seeks to submit the Sell Offer, that such Sell Offer is permissible because it is consistent with the competitive, cost-based, fixed, net cost of new entry were the resource to rely solely on revenues from PJM-administered markets. The following requirements shall apply to requests for such determinations:

i) The Capacity Market Seller shall submit a written request with all of the required documentation as described below and in the PJM Manuals. For such purpose, per subsection (h)(9)(i) below, the Office of the Interconnection shall post a preliminary estimate for the relevant Delivery Year of the MOPR Floor Offer Price expected to be established hereunder.

~~If the MOPR Floor Offer Price subsequently established for the relevant Delivery Year is less than the Sell Offer, the Sell Offer shall be permitted and no exception shall be required.~~

ii) ~~As more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, t~~The Capacity Market Seller must include in its request for an exception for new entry under this subsection documentation to support the fixed development, construction, operation, and maintenance costs of the MOPR Screened Generation Resource, as well as estimates of offsetting net revenues.

~~Estimates of costs or revenues shall be supported at a level of detail comparable to the cost and revenue estimates used to support the Net Asset Class Cost of New Entry established under this section 5.14(h). The financial modeling assumptions for calculating Cost of New Entry shall be the same modeling assumptions used to determine Cost of New Entry for the RPM auction parameters: (i) nominal levelization of gross costs, (ii) asset life of 20 years, (iii) no residual value, (iv) all project costs included with no sunk costs excluded, (v) use first year revenues, and (vi) weighted average cost of capital (WACC) based on the actual cost of capital for the entity proposing to build the MOPR Screened Generation Resource. As more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, s~~Supporting documentation for project costs ~~shall~~may include, as applicable ~~and available~~, a complete project description; environmental permits; vendor quotes for plant or equipment; evidence of actual costs of recent comparable projects; bases for electric and gas interconnection costs and any cost contingencies; bases and support for property taxes, insurance, operations and maintenance (“O&M”) contractor costs, and other fixed O&M and administrative or general costs; financing documents for construction period and permanent financing or evidence of recent debt costs of the seller for comparable investments; and the bases and support for the claimed capitalization ratio, rate of return, cost-recovery period, inflation rate, or other parameters used in financial modeling. ~~Such documentation also shall identify and support any sunk costs that the Capacity Market Seller has reflected as a reduction to its Sell Offer~~

The request shall include a certification, signed by an officer of the Capacity Market Seller, that the claimed costs accurately reflect, in all material respects, the seller’s reasonably expected costs of new entry and that the request satisfies all standards for a Unit-Specific Exception hereunder.

The request also shall identify all revenue sources relied upon in the Sell Offer to offset the claimed fixed costs, including, without limitation, long-term power supply contracts, tolling agreements, or tariffs on file with state regulatory agencies, and shall demonstrate that such offsetting revenues are consistent, over a reasonable time period identified by the Capacity Market Seller, with the standard prescribed above. In making such demonstration, the Capacity Market Seller may rely upon forecasts of competitive electricity prices in the PJM Region based on well defined models that include fully documented estimates of future fuel prices, variable operation and maintenance expenses, energy demand, emissions allowance prices, and expected environmental or energy policies that affect the seller’s forecast of electricity prices in such region, employing input data from sources readily available to the public. Documentation for net revenues also may include, as available and applicable, plant performance and capability information, including heat rate, start-up times and costs, forced outage rates, planned outage schedules, maintenance cycle, fuel costs and other variable operations and maintenance expenses, and ancillary service capabilities.

A Capacity Market Seller using a Unit Specific Exception other than the Unit Specific Exception applicable to new entry, shall submit a Sell Offer equal to the higher of the Avoidable Cost Rate, as defined in 6.8(a), net of Projected PJM Market Revenues, and the value obtained by incorporating the opportunity cost of Capacity Performance participation in a manner consistent with the derivation of the Market Seller Offer Cap, but employing alternative assumptions for the availability ratio (A), the number of Performance Assessment Hours (H), the Balancing Ratio (B), and the Capacity Performance bonus payment rate (CPBR) based on the actual market conditions and the actual circumstances of the unit. All supporting data must be provided for all requests.

A sworn, notarized certification of a duly authorized officer of the Capacity Market Seller is submitted certifying that the officer has personal knowledge of, or has engaged in a diligent inquiry to determine, the facts and circumstances supporting Seller's decision to submit a Sell Offer into the RPM Auction for the MOPR Screened Generation Resource and seek a Unit-Specific Exception from the MOPR Floor Offer Price for such resource, and to the best of his/her knowledge and belief: (A) the information supplied to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of Interconnection in support of its exception request is true and correct and the MOPR Screened Generation Resource will be Owned and Contracted Capacity for the benefit of the Seller; (B) Seller has disclosed all material facts relevant to the exception request; and (C) the Seller satisfies the criteria for the exception.

iii) A Sell Offer evaluated under the Unit-Specific Exception shall be permitted if the information provided reasonably demonstrates that the Sell Offer's competitive, cost-based, fixed, net cost of new entry is below the MOPR Floor Offer Price, based on competitive cost advantages relative to the costs implied by the MOPR Floor Offer Price, including, without limitation, competitive cost advantages resulting from the Capacity Market Seller's business model, financial condition, tax status, access to capital or other similar conditions affecting the applicant's costs, or based on net revenues that are reasonably demonstrated hereunder to be higher than those implied by the MOPR Floor Offer Price. Capacity Market Sellers shall be asked to demonstrate that claimed cost advantages or sources of net revenue that are irregular or anomalous, that do not reflect arm's-length transactions, or that are not in the ordinary course of the Capacity Market Seller's business are consistent with the standards of this subsection. Failure to adequately support such costs or revenues so as to enable the Office of the Interconnection to make the determination required in this section will result in denial of a Unit-Specific Exception hereunder by the Office of the Interconnection.

(9) Exemption/Exception Process.

i) The Office of the Interconnection shall post, by no later than one hundred fifty (150) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for an RPM Auction, a preliminary estimate for the relevant Delivery Year of the MOPR Floor Offer Price.

ii) The Capacity Market Seller must submit its request for a Unit-Specific Exception, ~~Competitive Entry Exemption~~ or an Exemption defined in subsections (6), (7), (7A) or (7B) Self Supply Exemption in writing simultaneously to the Market Monitoring Unit and

the Office of Interconnection by no later than one hundred thirty five (135) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the RPM Auction in which such seller seeks to submit its Sell Offer. The Capacity Market Seller shall include in its request a description of its MOPR Screened Generation Resource, the exemption or exception that the Capacity Market Seller is requesting, and all documentation necessary to demonstrate that the exemption or exception criteria are satisfied, including without limitation the applicable certification(s) specified in this subsection (h). In addition to the documentation identified herein and in the PJM Manuals, the Capacity Market Seller shall provide any additional supporting information reasonably requested by the Office of the Interconnection or the Market Monitoring Unit to evaluate the Sell Offer. Requests for additional documentation will not extend the deadline by which the Office of the Interconnection or the Market Monitoring Unit must provide their determinations of the exemption request. The Capacity Market Seller shall have an ongoing obligation through the closing of the offer period for the RPM Auction to update the request to reflect any material changes in the request.

iii) As further described in Section II.D. of Attachment M-Appendix to this Tariff, the Market Monitoring Unit shall review the request and supporting documentation and shall provide its determination by no later than forty-five (45) days after receipt of the exemption or exception request. The Office of the Interconnection shall also review all exemption and exception requests to determine whether the request is acceptable in accordance with the standards and criteria under this section 5.14(h) and shall provide its determination in writing to the Capacity Market Seller, with a copy to the Market Monitoring Unit, by no later than sixty-five (65) days after receipt of the exemption or exception request. The Office of the Interconnection shall reject a requested exemption or exception if the Capacity Market Seller's request does not comply with the PJM Market Rules, as interpreted and applied by the Office of the Interconnection. Such rejection shall specify those points of non-compliance upon which the Office of the Interconnection based its rejection of the exemption or exception request. If the Office of the Interconnection does not provide its determination on an exemption or exception request by no later than sixty-five (65) days after receipt of the exemption or exception request, the request shall be deemed granted. Following the Office of the Interconnection's determination on a Unit-Specific Exception request, the Capacity Market Seller shall notify the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection, in writing, of the minimum level of Sell Offer, consistent with such determination, to which it agrees to commit by no later than five (5) days after receipt of the Office of the Interconnection's determination of its Unit-Specific Exception request. A Capacity Market Seller that is dissatisfied with any determination hereunder may seek any remedies available to it from FERC; provided, however, that the Office of the Interconnection will proceed with administration of the Tariff and market rules unless and until ordered to do otherwise by FERC.

(10) Procedures and Remedies in Cases of Suspected Fraud or Material Misrepresentation or Omissions in Connection with Exemption Requests.

In the event the Office of the Interconnection reasonably believes that a request for an ~~an Competitive Entry Exemption or a Self Supply Exemption~~ Exemption defined in subsections (6), (7), (7A) or (7B) that has been granted contains fraudulent or material misrepresentations or fraudulent or material omissions such that the Capacity Market Seller would not have been eligible for the exemption for that resource had the request not contained such misrepresentations or omissions, then:

i) if the Office of the Interconnection provides written notice of revocation to the Capacity Market Seller no later than thirty (30) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the RPM Auction for which the seller submitted a fraudulent exemption request, the Office of the Interconnection shall revoke the exemption for that auction. In such event, the Office of the Interconnection shall make any filings with FERC that the Office of the Interconnection deems necessary, and

ii) if the Office of the Interconnection does not provide written notice of revocation no later than 30 days before the start of the relevant RPM Auction, then the Office of the Interconnection may not revoke the exemption absent FERC approval. In any such filing to FERC, the requested remedies shall include (A) in the event that such resource has not cleared in the RPM Auction for which the exemption has been granted and the filing is made no later than 5 days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the RPM Auction, revocation of the exemption or, (B) in the event that the resource has cleared the RPM Auction for which the exemption has been granted and the filing is made no later than two (2) years after the close of the offer period for the relevant RPM Auction, suspension of any payments, during the pendency of the FERC proceeding, to the Capacity Market Seller for the resource that cleared in any RPM Auction relying on such exemption; and suspension of the Capacity Market Seller's exemption for that resource for future RPM Auctions.

iii) Prior to any automatic revocation or submission to FERC, the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit shall notify the affected Capacity Market Seller and, to the extent practicable, provide the Capacity Market Seller an opportunity to explain the alleged misrepresentation or omission. Any filing to FERC under this provision shall seek fast track treatment and neither the name nor any identifying characteristics of the Capacity Market Seller or the resource shall be publicly revealed, but otherwise the filing shall be public. The Capacity Market Seller may apply for a new exemption for that resource for subsequent auctions, including auctions held during the pendency of the FERC proceeding. In the event that the Capacity Market Seller is cleared by FERC from such allegations of misrepresentations or omissions then the exemption shall be restored to the extent and in the manner permitted by FERC. The remedies required by this subsection (h)(10) to be requested in any filing to FERC shall not be exclusive of any other remedies or penalties that may be pursued against the Capacity Market Seller.

i) Capacity Export Charges and Credits

(1) Charge

Each Capacity Export Transmission Customer shall incur for each day of each Delivery Year a Capacity Export Charge equal to the Reserved Capacity of Long-Term Firm Transmission Service used for such export ("Export Reserved Capacity") multiplied by (the Final Zonal Capacity Price for such Delivery Year for the Zone encompassing the interface with the Control Area to which such capacity is exported minus the Final Zonal Capacity Price for such Delivery Year for the Zone in which the resources designated for export are located, but not less than zero). If more than one Zone forms the interface with such Control Area, then the amount of Reserved Capacity described above shall be apportioned among such Zones for purposes of the above calculation in

proportion to the flows from such resource through each such Zone directly to such interface under CETO/CETL analysis conditions, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection using procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals. The amount of the Reserved Capacity that is associated with a fully controllable facility that crosses such interface shall be completely apportioned to the Zone within which such facility terminates.

(2) Credit

To recognize the value of firm Transmission Service held by any such Capacity Export Transmission Customer, such customer assessed a charge under section 5.14(i)(1) also shall receive a credit, comparable to the Capacity Transfer Rights provided to Load-Serving Entities under section 5.15. Such credit shall be equal to the locational capacity price difference specified in section 5.14(i)(1) times the Export Customer's Allocated Share determined as follows:

Export Customer's Allocated Share equals

$(\text{Export Path Import} * \text{Export Reserved Capacity}) /$

$(\text{Export Reserved Capacity} + \text{Daily Unforced Capacity Obligations of all LSEs in such Zone}).$

Where:

“Export Path Import” means the megawatts of Unforced Capacity imported into the export interface Zone from the Zone in which the resource designated for export is located.

If more than one Zone forms the interface with such Control Area, then the amount of Export Reserved Capacity shall be apportioned among such Zones for purposes of the above calculation in the same manner as set forth in subsection (i)(1) above.

(3) Distribution of Revenues

Any revenues collected from the Capacity Export Charge with respect to any capacity export for a Delivery Year, less the credit provided in subsection (i)(2) for such Delivery Year, shall be distributed to the Load Serving Entities in the export-interface Zone that were assessed a

Locational Reliability Charge for such Delivery Year, pro rata based on the Daily Unforced Capacity Obligations of such Load-serving Entities in such Zone during such Delivery Year. If more than one Zone forms the interface with such Control Area, then the revenues shall be apportioned among such Zones for purposes of the above calculation in the same manner as set forth in subsection (i)(1) above.