

Markets Track Proposal: Concerns with FTR Underfunding

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 Some stakeholders have expressed concerns with the "count-down" balance of planning period (BOPP) design component leading to a higher risk of FTR underfunding


As a result of this concern, vote deferred from 12/5 to 12/19 MRC

- PJM staff does not anticipate any added risk to FTR underfunding as a result of this proposal
 - 75% support at September 2019 FRMSTF vote (see appendix)



- FTR underfunding exists when more capability allocated in FTR market than what is available in the Day-Ahead market
 - Not enough congestion revenue is collected from the Day-ahead market to fully fund all outstanding FTR target credits
- Discrepancies in capability allocated can happen for a number of reasons, including but not limited to:
 - Increased limits utilized in FTR model due to Stage 1A ARR infeasibilities
 - Reduced transmission capability in Day-Ahead market due to transmission outages and model
 - Loop flow / uncompensated flow impacts






FTR 1: 300 MW Obligation from A to B

FTR 2: 180 MW Obligation from A to B

Net Flow on Line A-B = 480 MW

Line A-B Flow = Line A-B Rating therefore both FTRs are simultaneously feasible






FTR 1: 300 MW Obligation from A to B

FTR 2: 300 MW Obligation from A to B

Net Flow on Line A-B = 600 MW

Line A-B Flow > Line A-B Rating therefore both FTRs are <u>NOT</u> simultaneously feasible





Day Ahead Congestion Charge = 500 MW (\$20 - \$10) = \$5,000

FTR Target Allocation (using SFT Example 1 FTRs)

Total FTR Target Allocation = 480 MW (\$20 - \$10) = \$4,800

FTR Target Allocation (using SFT Example 2 FTRs)

Total FTR Target Allocation = 600 MW (\$20 - \$10) = \$6,000



July and December 2019 Auction Example

Auctions

July 2019 (JUL, AUG, SEP, Q2, Q3, Q4)

December 2019 (DEC, JAN, FEB, Q4)

Dec thru Feb FTR Effective Period(s)

July Auction

Q3

Status Quo


DEC JAN FEB

December Auction

December Auction

July 2019 (JUL, AUG, SEP, OCT, NOV, DEC, JAN, FEB, MAR, APR, MAY)

December 2019 (DEC, JAN, FEB, MAR, APR, MAY)




Majority of this transmission system capability is consumed by annual FTRs awarded in May 2019



Transmission Outage Criteria Example

Assume a 5-day 230kV outage is submitted for December 10th-15th



- **STATUS QUO**: reduced capability due to 5 day outage modeled in all three months
- PROPOSAL: reduced capability due to 5 day outage modeled only in one month
- RESULT 1: more accurate model
- RESULT 2: more reflective clearing prices of future settlement period
- RESULT 3: additional capability available in JAN and FEB months

Outage modeled in this period only

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- Proposal does not exacerbate concern over lack of information
 - Criteria for outage modeling does not change
 - Criteria for outage submissions does not change
 - Large outages are required to be submitted to PJM by February 1
- Proposal simply makes monthly models more reflective of projected system conditions
 - This does not mean that FTRs for future months will be over-allocated

Majority of capability allocated annually, not during BOPP




Appendix: Proposal Details

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75%

September Voting Results



- Package A received majority support; majority prefer to make a change
- Minor points of contention included:
 - Retaining quarter effective periods for BOPP vs. months only (Package C)
 - Annual long-term products vs. quarter long-term products (Package B)
 - Timing of 5 long-term rounds (resolved in Package A proposal)

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| Design Component | Status Quo | Modification | Justification |
| Frequency of long-term auctions | 3 times a year; JUN, SEP, DEC | 5 times a year; JUN, AUG, OCT, DEC, MAR | Provide increased level of protection from a potential default by not allowing positions to grow or deteriorate over time without posting of additional collateral |
| Capability offered per long- term auction round | 33.33% of residual capability available each round | 20% of residual capability available each round | |
| Available periods for the monthly FTR BOPP auctions | Any 3 individual months in the future, any remaining full quarter in the planning period that does not overlap with first three individual months | Any remaining individual month in the planning period | Maximize pricing information More granular modeling Better case performance allows more time to analyze results |